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Abstract. The past few years have seen the emergence of a large num-
ber of proposals for electronic payments over open networks. Among
these proposals is the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol pro-
moted by MasterCard and VISA which is currently being deployed world-
wide. While SET has a number of advantages over other proposals in
terms of simplicity and openness, there seems to be a consensus regard-
ing the relative ine±ciency of the protocol. This paper proposes a light-
weight version of the SET protocol, called \LITESET". For the same
level of security as recommended in the latest version of SET speci¯ca-
tions, LITESET shows a 53.1/53.7% reduction in the computational time
in message generation/veri¯cation and a 79.9% reduction in communica-
tion overhead. This has been achieved by the use of a new cryptographic
primitive called signcryption. We hope that our proposal can contribute
to the practical and engineering side of real-world electronic payments.
1 Introduction
There is a growing demand for global electronic payments. The Secure Electronic
Transaction (SET) protocol is being regarded as one of the important candidates.
However, straightforward implementation of SET may impose heavy computa-
tion and message overhead on a system that employs SET, primarily due to its
use of the RSA digital signature and encryption scheme [7]. This article makes
an attempt to improve the e±ciency of SET by using a new cryptographic tech-
nology called signcryption[1], which simultaneously ful¯lls both the functions of
digital signature and public-key encryption in a logically single step. We show
how to incorporate signcryption into SET, and evaluate the e±ciency of our
implementation. Our improved SET will be called \LITESET" or a light-weight
Secure Electronic Transaction protocol.Detailed analysis and comparison shows that LITESET represents a 53.1%
reduction in the computational time in message generation, a 53.7% reduction
in the computational time in message veri¯cation, and a 79.9% reduction in
communication overhead.
Section 2 gives a brief review of the SET protocol. Problems with the e±-
ciency of SET are summarized in Section 3. Section 4 proposes an adaptation
of signcryption for SET. Our LITESET protocol is also speci¯ed in the same
section. This is followed by Section 5 where signi¯cant improvements of LITE-
SET over SET are presented. Section 6 closes the paper with some concluding
remarks.
2 An Overview of SET
The payment model on which SET is based consists of three participants: a
cardholder, a merchant, and a payment gateway. The card holder initiates a
payment with the merchant. The merchant then has the payment authorized;
the payment gateway acts as the front end to the existing ¯nancial network,
and through this the card issuer can be contacted to explicitly authorize each
and every transaction that takes place. In the SET protocol, there are in total
32 di®erent types of messages[3]. There messages are summarized in Table 1.
Among these messages, among which the most important and transmitted at the
highest frequency are the following six [2],[4]: PInitReq, PInitRes, PReq, PRes,
AuthReq and AuthRes. Each abbreviated message is summarized in Table 2.
Other messages are used mainly for administrative purposes, such as creating
certi¯cates, canceling messages, registration, error handling etc. Hence these
message are transmitted at a far smaller frequency than the above mentioned
six messages, which in turn implies that any attempt to improve the e±ciency
of SET must focus on the six main messages. The °ow of the six main messages
is shown in Figure 1.
Next we discuss in detail the functions of the six messages. A few frequently
used notations are summarized in Table 2.
The SET protocol starts with Purchase Initialization (implementation of
PInitReq and PInitRes is shown in Table 3). Purchase Request is then exe-
cuted conforming to the structure described in Table 4. In PReq, PI and OI are
destined to di®erent entities but sent in the same cryptographic envelope. They
share a signature called Dual signature[3],[4] which can be veri¯ed by either
entity. Dual signature used in SET is constructed as illustrated in Table 4.
On receiving PReq, the merchant veri¯es it (especially, Dual signature). If
it is valid, he produces AuthReq and sends it to the payment gateway (P).
AuthRseq includes AuthReqData and PI, where PI is copied from PReq.
On receiving AuthReq, the payment gateway veri¯es it. If successful, the pay-
ment gateway sends AuthRes back to the merchant. AuthRes includes CapToken
and AuthResData, which shows the state of the transaction. If the veri¯cation
of AuthReq fails, only AuthResData is sent as AuthRes. Table 5 shows the
structure of AuthReq/Res.Table 1. SET messages.
PInitReq,PInitRes Purchase initialization request/response.
PReq,PRes Purchase request/response.
AuthReq,AuthRes Authorization request/response.
AuthRevReq,AuthRevRes Authorization reversal request/response.
InqReq,InqRes Inquiry request/response.
CapReq,CapRes Capture request/response.
CapRevReq,CapRevRes Capture reversal request/response.
CredReq,CredRes Credit request/response.
CredRevReq,CredRevRes Credit reversal request/response.
PCertReq,PCertRes Payment gateway's certi¯cate request/response.
BatchAdminReq,BatchAdminRes Batch Administration request/response.
CardCInitReq,CardCInitRes Cardholder's certi¯cate initialization request/response.
Me-AqCInitReq,Me-AqCInitRes Merchant's or acquirer's certi¯cate initialization
request/response.
RegFormReq,RegFormRes Registration form request/response.
CertReq,CertRes Certi¯cate request/response.
CertInqReq,CertInqRes Certi¯cate inquiry request/response.
Table 2. Notations
Ek(t) to encrypt t by using a key k.
Dk(t) to decrypt t by using a key k.
H(t) to hash t
Pve participant e's private key
Pbe participant e's public key
Finally, the protocol is ¯nished with PRes produced by the merchant (the
structure of PRes is shown in Table 6).
3 Problems with the E±ciency of SET
As mentioned above, all the public-key encryption and digital signature used
in SET are based on the RSA scheme. RSA requires a relatively large com-
putational cost and large message overhead. Based on \square-and-multiply"
and \simultaneous multiple exponentiation"[5], the main computational cost for
one public-key encryption or one digital signature generation is estimated to be
1:5
4 ¢ jnj modulo multiplications where n is a composite of the RSA scheme. For
PReq generation, for example, one public-key encryption and one digital signa-
ture generation are required, therefore the computational cost is estimated to be
768 modulo multiplications (n = 1024bits). Part of Table 9 shows computational
costs for message generations and veri¯cations in SET, respectively.Fig.1. Flows of SET messages
Table 3. Structure of PInitReq/Res.
message message factor
PInitReq fRRPID,LID-C,Chall C,BrandID,BINg
PInitRes fPInitResData,EPvM(H(PInitResData))g
RRPID UniqueID for one pair of request and response.
LID-C LocalID of cardholder's transaction.
Chall C Cardholder's challenge.
BIN Cardholder's account number.
PInitResData fTransID,RRPID,Chall C, Chall M,PEThumbg
TransID TransactionID.
Chall M Merchant's challenge.
BrandID Brand of card.
PEThumb Thumbprint of payment gateway public key certi¯cate.
Turning now to message or communication overhead, digital signatures and
public-key encrypted session keys are regarded as the main overhead. Besides
them, hashed variables (160bits) for message linking are also regarded as message
overhead. The message overhead for one digital signature or public-key encrypted
session key is estimated to be n. Hence, as an example, for PReq generation,
there are one public-key encryption, one digital signature, and three hashed
variables, so the message overhead is estimated to be 2008 bits (PANData and
the session key are altogether encrypted with the cardholder's public key, so that
the message overhead is less than the total amount mentioned above). Part of
Table 10 shows the message overhead in SET.
4 LITESET | a Light-Weight Version of SET
In this section, we will show how to improve SET in terms of e±ciency: speci¯-
cally, how to adapt signcryption for SET. The most important part of this workTable 4. Structure of PReq.
message message factor
PReq fPI,OIg
PI fEPbP (k,PANData, nonce),
Ek(PI-OILink,H(PANData,nonce)), Dual signature g
OI f OIData,H(PIData) g
PANData Primary account number data.
PIData Purchase instruction data.
OIData Order information data.
PI-OILink fPIData(except PANData),H(OIData)g
Dual signature EPvCfH(H(PIData),H(OIData))g
Table 5. Structure of AuthReq/Req.
message massage factor
AuthReq fEPbP (k),Ek(AuthReqData,H(PI),
EPvM( H(AuthReqData,H(PI)))), PIg
AuthRes fEPbM(k),Ek(AuthResData,H(Captoken),
EPvP (H(AuthResData,H(CapToken))), CapTokeng
AuthReqData Authorization request data.
AuthResData Authorization response data.
is how to link a message to another message. In our improvement, there are two
kinds of e±cient linking: LinkedData and CoupledData. The details appear in
the following subsection.
4.1 Notation
Table 7 shows the parameters which are used in this paper (notice that Ex(t),
Dx(t), H(t), Pve and Pbe are de¯ned in Table 2). In the following, we de¯ne the
public key of entity e as Pbe = gPve mod p.
4.2 LinkedData
In SET, we often ¯nd a situation where the sender (S) has to
Table 6. Structure of PRes.
message message factor
PRes fPResData,EPvM(H(PResData))g
PResData Purchase response data.Table 7. Parameters for LITESET messages.
KHk(t) to hash t with a key k
p a large prime
q a large prime factor of p ¡ 1
g an integer in [1;¢¢¢;p ¡ 1] with order q modulo p
¢ sign the message M1,
¢ encrypt it with the recipient (R)'s public key,
¢ and show the relationship between M1 and M2.
In conventional SET, to satisfy such demands, H(M2) is attached to M1, and
these messages are signed by using S's private key and then encrypted by using
R's public key. Then, R can verify the linking between M1 and M2 by checking
the value of H(M2). Namely, if someone falsi¯es M2, R can ¯nd that M2 is
falsi¯ed.
To e±ciently apply signcryption scheme, we use hashed M2 in the veri¯cation
of the signcrypted M1. These linked messages are referred to as LinkedData.
Now let us proceed to show how to construct LinkedData. The message to
be sent by S to R is LinkedDataS;PbR(M1;M2) which is composed as follows:
{ LinkedDataS;PbR(M1;M2) = fLSCS;PbR;M2(M1);M2g
where LSCS;PbR;M2(M1) = fr;s;cg, and r;s;c are de¯ned by:
x 2R [1;¢¢¢;q ¡ 1]
(k1;k2) = H(PbR
x mod p)
r = KHk1(H(M1);H(M2))
s =
x
r+PvS mod q
c = Ek2(M1)
On receiving LinkedDataS;PbR(M1;M2), R veri¯es it as follows:
1. (k1;k2) = H((PbS ¢ g
r)
s¢PvR mod p)
2. M1 = Dk2(c)
3. If r = KHk1(H(M1);H(M2)), R accepts M1;M2.
As one can see immediately, in order to be able to verify the message M1,
unfalsi¯ed H(M2) is required. Thus, if someone falsi¯es M2, R can detect that
it is indeed falsi¯ed. As examples, AuthReq and AuthRes are described as
LinkedData.
4.3 CoupledData
Generally, dual signature is used for linking two messages whose recipients are
di®erent. Thus, although one recipient can only see the contents of the message
M1 he receives, he can be con¯dent of the digest H(M2) of the other message M2.
Hence, if one recipient wants to con¯rm the linking of the two messages, the two
recipients send dual signatures EPvS(H(H(M1);H(M2))), messages and message
digests they received to a reliable institution. By using them and sender's publickey, the reliable institution can detect a dishonest act. If DPbS(Dualsignature) is
not identical to H(H(M1);H(M2)) which is made from components sent by one
recipient, the reliable institution knows this recipient forged M1 and/or H(M2).
And, if dual signatures are valid and M1(M2) which is received by one recipient
is not hashed to be H(M1(M2)) which is received by the other recipient, the
reliable institution knows the sender conducted a dishonest act.
Here we show how to realize the function of dual signature by applying
signcryption. Let the messages which are linked by using this scheme be called
CoupledData.
When S sends PReq to R, S must
¢ sign the messages, M1 and M2,
¢ encrypt only M1,
¢ send M1 and M2 to R,
¢ let R send M1 to R0 with keeping M1 unread,
¢ and show the relationship between M1 and M2
where R0 is the true recipient of M1. In SET, C acts S, M acts R, and P acts
R0.
In our implementation, S send CoupledDataS;PbR0(M1;M2) to R as follows:
{ CoupledDataS;PbR0(M1;M2) = fCSCS;PbR0;M2(M1);CSigS;M1(M2)g
3 CSigS;M1(M2) = fs1;r1;M2;H(M1)g
x1 2R [1;¢¢¢;q ¡ 1]
r1 = H(g
x1;H(M1);H(M2)[;etc])
s1 =
x1
r1+PvS mod q
On receiving CoupledDataS;PbR0(M1;M2), R veri¯es it as follows:
1. (g
x1) = H((PbS ¢ g
r1)
s1 mod p)
2. If r1 = H(g
x1;H(M1);H(M2)[;etc]),
R accepts M2, and sends CSCS;PbR0;M2(M1) and H(M2) to R
0.
3 CSCS;PbR0;M2(M1) =fr2;s2;c2g
x2 2R [1;¢¢¢;q ¡ 1]
(k1;k2) = H(PbR0x2 mod p)
r2 = KHk1(H(M1);H(M2)[;etc])
s2 =
x2
r2+PvS mod q
c2 = Ek2(M1)
R
0 veri¯es CSCS;PbR0;M2(M1) as follows:
1. (k1;k2) = H((PbS ¢ g
r2)
s2¢PvR0 mod p)
2. fM1g = Dk2(c2)
3. If r2 = KHk1(H(M1);H(M2)[;etc]), R
0 accepts M1.
If S wants to designate the recipient of the message, S should put the recip-
ient's public key in etc.
If S wants to encrypt M2, S should send CoupledData as follows:
{ CoupledDataS;PbR0;PbR(M1;M2) = fCSCS;PbR0;M2(M1);CSCS;PbR;M1(M2)g3 CSCS;PbR;M1(M2) = fs1;r1;c1g
x1 2R [1;¢¢¢;q ¡ 1]
(k3;k4) = H(PbR
x1 mod p)
s1 =
x1
r1+PvS mod q
r1 = KHk3(H(M1);H(M2)[;etc])
c1 = Ek4(M1)
R veri¯es CSCS;PbR;M1(M2) = fs1;r1;c1g as follows:
1. (k3;k4) = H((PbS ¢ g
r1)
s1¢PvR mod p)
2. fM2g = Dk4(c1)
3. If r1 = KHk3(H(M1);H(M2)[;etc]), R accepts M1 (of course, S has
to send H(M1) with CoupledDataS;PbR0;PbR(M1;M2)), and should send
CSCS;PbR0;M2(M1) and H(M2).
Although dishonest acts are detected in almost the same way as in Dual
signature scheme, there exist several di®erences. (1) recipient's private keys are
required for detection. (2) although the two recipients can be con¯dent that they
have received the same signature in the conventional SET, recipients cannot
be con¯dent of the signature which is received by the other recipient in our
scheme. With our scheme, more computational costs need to be invested to detect
dishonest acts. However, as the need of detection of dishonest acts should arise in
very rare situations, we believe that the extra computational costs for detecting
dishonest acts with our scheme should not be a disadvantage in practice.
4.4 Messages in LITESET
Embodying LinkedData and CoupledData in SET results is a light weight ver-
sion of the protocol called LITESET. For the six main messages, LinkedData is
adapted to AuthReq((M1;M2) =(AuthReqData, PI)) and AuthRes((M1;M2) =
(AuthResData, CapToken)), and CoupledData is adapted to PReq((M1;M2) =
(PIData, OIData)). Moreover, to sign only, such as PInitRes and PRes, SDSS1
[1] is adapted to such messages. The six main messages in LITESET are de-
scribed in Table 8
Table 8. Six Main Messages of LITESET.
message message factor
PInitReq fRRPID,LID-C,Chall C,BrandID,BINg
PInitRes fSigM(PInitResData)g
PReq fCoupledDataC;PbP (PIData,OIData)g
If OIData is encrypted,
fCoupledDataC;PbP ;PbM(PIData,OIData), H(PIData)g
AuthReq fLinkedDataM;PbP (AuthReqData,
fCSCS;PbP ;OIData(PIData),H(OIData)g)g
AuthRes fLinkedDataP;PbM(AuthReqData, CapToken)g
PRes fSigM(PResData)gFor other messages, operations mentioned above are adapted similarly ac-
cording to their message type. A detailed description of the messages will be
given in the ¯nal version of this paper.
5 LITESET v.s. SET
LITESET relies for its security on the computational infeasibility of the discrete
logarithm problem. Assuming the di±culty of computing the discrete logarithm,
the signcryption scheme embodied in LITESET has been known to be secure
against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (the most powerful attacks that
one can conceive in the real world). Similar to the original SET protocol, the
LITESET protocol is secure in practice. The rest of this section is devoted to a
detailed comparison of the e±ciency of LITESET against that of SET. Here, we
compare LITESET with SET based on RSA, which is the most common imple-
mentation. Elliptic cryptosystems1 are known as a quite e±cient cryptgraphical
technology. But, we don't investigate them here.
5.1 Computational costs
The computational cost depends mainly on modulo exponentiations in encryp-
tion or signature generation. Hence, the number of modulo multiplications in
modulo exponentiation can be used as the computational cost. We estimate the
number of modulo multiplications by using \square-and-multiply" and \simulta-
neous multiple exponentiation". Namely, the number of modulo multiplications
for one gx or Pbe
x is 1:5 ¢ jqj, and that for (Pbe1 ¢ gr)s¢Pve2 is 7
4 ¢ jqj. In conven-
tional SET, 1024-bit RSA composite is used. To achieve the same security level,
jqj = 160bits and jpj = 1024bits should be chosen for our scheme [1]. Table 9(a)
shows the costs of message generation and veri¯cation of the six main messages.
We see that the computational costs are saved over 50%2. For other messages,
Table 9(b) shows the costs of message generation and veri¯cation respectively
where we can also see the signi¯cant cost reduction.
In a most probable situation, cardholder's computer is much slower than
merchant's and payment gateway's. Hence, the e±ciency depends largely on
the load on cardholder's computer. Our proposal reduces this load signi¯cantly;
PReq(generation), PInitRes(veri¯cation) and PRes(veri¯cation) are managed
on cardholder's computer, and their computational costs are saved as much as
37.0%.
1 Signcryption on elliptic curves[8] has been already proposed, and we can realize
LITESET on elliptic curves easily.
2 It is di±cult to make quantitative analysis of computational costs involved in cer-
ti¯cate veri¯cation, which heavily depends on the structure of a cerri¯cation infras-
tructure employed. Thus, we don't investigate them here.5.2 Message overhead
In our evaluation, digital signature and public key encrypted session key are
regarded as message overhead. Namely, for our scheme, r(jrj = 80bits), s(jsj =
160bits) and hashed variables(jH(t)j = 160bits) for message linking are message
overhead. Table 10(a) shows the message overhead of the six main messages.
We see that message overhead is saved over 70% for each message. Table 10(b)
shows the message overhead of other messages; hence the reduction of message
overhead is also signi¯cant.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a new and very practical method which reduces computational cost
and message overhead of SET messages is proposed by applying signcryption. In
SET, messages are often signed, encrypted and linked to other messages. With
the help of signcryption, all of these functions are ful¯lled, but with a far smaller
cost than that required by SET. In the future, security parameters will be larger
to compensate advances in cryptanalysis, and the advantages of our proposed
LITESET over the current version of SET based on RSA will be more apparent.
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(a)main messages
message conventional scheme our scheme
ourscheme
conventionalscheme
PInitReq -/- -/- -/-
PInitRes 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729
PReq 768/384 480/280 0.625/0.729
AuthReq 768/1536 240/560 0.313/0.365
AuthRes 1536/768 480/280 0.313/0.365
PRes 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729
Total 3072/3456 1440/1600 0.469/0.463
(b)other messages
message conventional scheme our scheme
ourscheme
conventionalscheme
AuthRevReq 768/1536 240/560 0.313/0.365
AuthRevRes 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CapReq 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CapRes 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CapRevReq 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CapRevRes 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CredReq 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CredRes 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CredRevReq 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CredRevRes 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
PCertReq 384/384 240/280 0.313/0.729
PCertRes 384/384 240/280 0.313/0.729
BatchAdminReq 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
BatchAdminRes 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CardCInitReq -/- -/- -/-
CardCInitRes 384/384 240/280 0.313/0.729
Me-AqCInitReq -/- -/- -/-
Me-AqcInitRes 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729
RegFormReq 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729
RegFormRes 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729
CertReq 768/768 240/280 0.313/0.365
CertRes 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729
CertInqReq 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729
CertInqRes 384/384 240/280 0.625/0.729Table 10. Message overhead.
(a)main messages
message conventional scheme our scheme
ourscheme
conventionalscheme
PInitReq - - -
PInitRes 1024bit 320bit 0.313
PReq 2008bit 720bit 0.359
AuthReq 4056bit 640bit 0.158
AuthRes 4256bit 480bit 0.113
PRes 1024bit 320bit 0.313
Total 12368bit 2480bit 0.201
(b)other messages
message conventional scheme our scheme
ourscheme
conventionalscheme
AuthRevReq 6114bit 880bit 0.144
AuthRevRes 4256bit 480bit 0.113
CapReq 2208 240 '0.12
+(2048¢n)bit +(240¢n)bit
CapRes 2048bit 240bit 0.117
CapRevReq 2208 240 '0.12
+(2048¢n)bit +(240¢n)bit
CapRevRes 2048bit 240bit 0.117
CredReq 2208 240 '0.12
+(2048¢n)bit +(240¢n)bit
CredRes 2048bit 240bit 0.117
CredRevReq 2208 240 '0.12
+(2048¢n)bit +(240¢n)bit
CredRevRes 2048bit 240bit 0.117
PCertReq 1024bit 320bit 0.313
PCertRes 1024bit 320bit 0.313
BatchAdminReq 2048bit 240bit 0.117
BatchAdminRes 2048bit 240bit 0.117
CardCInitReq - - -
CardCInitRes 1024bit 320bit 0.313
Me-AqCInitReq - - -
Me-AqcInitRes 2048bit 240bit 0.117
RegFormReq 1184bit 872bit 0.736
RegFormRes 1024bit 320bit 0.313
CertReq 1528bit 240bit 0.157
CertRes 1024bit 320bit 0.313
CertInqReq 1024bit 320bit 0.313
CertInqRes 1024bit 320bit 0.313